Canberra, ACT: Ecstasy and speed likely cause of collision

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has issued its final report into a collision on a level crossing in which the motorist was under the influence of drugs. The collision between a freight train and a light truck occurred on the Bumbunga level crossing in South Australia. Both the driver of the road vehicle and his passenger were fatally injured.

Toxicology tests conducted on the occupants of the utility vehicle revealed high levels of the drug MDMA (commonly known as ‘Ecstasy’) and Methylamphetamine (commonly known as ‘Ice’, ‘Speed’ or ‘Meth’); both are illicit drugs in Australia. ATSB has concluded that it is likely that the driver of the utility vehicle did not stop at the level crossing as the vehicle occupants failed to perceive and react to the oncoming train due to the effects of the drugs that both the driver and his passenger had taken.

(May 28th, 2010)

Hakodate line; Japan: Observation seats to be removed

As a consequence of lessons learned in the investigation of a level crossing accident, JR Hokkaido has decided to remove seats in the lower level of “Crystal Express” rolling stock in use on the Hakodate line. The accident in question was on a level crossing in Shenzen on January 29th, 2010, in which 45 passengers were injured.

JR Hokkaido is removing a total of 16 seats in the lower deck saloon in the outer vehicles of the “Crystal Express” trains. A partition will be constructed to prevent access to the seats at each end of these train sets.

The cause of the January 29th, 2010 accident has been determined to have been negligence on the part of the dump truck drivers who crossed into the path of the train.

(May 25th, 2010)

Observation car as used on Hakodate line, source JR Hokkaido

Fairfield FP level crossing, source RAIB

The United Kingdom’s independent Rail Accident Investigation Branch has published its report into the death of a woman and one of her dogs when they were struck by a train on the Fairfield footpath level crossing in Little Bedwyn, Wiltshire on May 6th, 2009 (LXinfo June 2009)

The Fairfield level crossing was protected by outward-opening gates. The crossing surface was made of wood and was incomplete in the space between the tracks, known as the six-foot. The crossing is equipped with telephones and associated warning notices. Line speed over the crossing is 100 mph.

Attempts to close the Fairfield level crossing had begun in 1973. However, there was opposition to the elimination of the public rights over the crossing. Notwithstanding this, private vehicular rights were extinguished by agreement in 1977. This led to the reclassification of the crossing as a bridleway. This in turn has been subject to further closure proposals being tabled in 1991. However, no agreement on closure was reached. Following the accident the footpath over the crossing was closed by a temporary order issued by Wiltshire County Council. Network Rail closed the crossing by padlocking the gates. The footpath and crossing were later reopened.

Although the investigation found that sighting at the Fairfield level crossing was deficient, this has been found not to be material to the fatal accident as the woman who was killed began to cross when the approaching train was already visible.

However, because of sighting limitations from one decision point of 6.4 seconds, whistle boards had been identified as necessary but were not in place at the time of the accident as on January 31st, 2006, because of public concerns and following a meeting with a group of MPs the previous day, Network Rail issued an instruction to its operational areas that “the fitment of any further ‘whistle’ boards at level crossings (including any already in the process of being fitted) should be put on hold forthwith”. This was said to be “pending the development of new guidelines for considering future fitments, and a review process for existing fitments that are the subject of public complaints”.

In early 2010, following local consultation, Network Rail HQ gave special authorisation for ‘whistle’ boards to be provided more than 400 metres away in both directions on the approaches to the crossing. A site inspection by the Office of Rail Regulation on March 15th, 2010 found that the crossing had been re-opened, and that the whistle boards appeared to have the desired effect. The very low level of background noise in the area means that train horns are likely to be effective and audible, even when sounded at this greater than normal distance.

The RAIB identified the possible causal factors as:

• That (although there is no direct evidence) as she approached the crossing, the woman who was killed may have been distracted when making her decision to cross the line by the presence of her dogs
• The way that pedestrians approaching the crossing may have used the longer view of approaching trains obtainable from a position a short distance back from the gate on the up side
• The absence of ‘whistle’ boards on the approach to the crossing (paragraph 69).

A possible contributory factor was the absence of an adequate risk assessment for the level crossing. An underlying factor was the difficulty of closing the level crossing, and its continued availability to members of the public as a footpath.

No recommendations have been made in respect of the above causal and contributory factors. However, recommendations to address matters observed during the investigation have been made as follows:

• Network Rail should review the operation of the All Level Crossing Risk Model with respect to sighting times at footpath crossings, to establish whether the sensitivity of the model to variations in sighting can be improved, and should modify the model if this review shows that it is reasonably practicable to do so. The intention of this recommendation is to ensure that the impact of limited sighting at footpath crossings is taken into account when assessing risk
• Network Rail should review the way it manages the risk to users at footpath level crossings, with the objective of highlighting to assessors when sighting is below the mandated standard, and providing clear guidance on the action to be taken if sub-standard sighting is identified during data collection or assessment. The intention of this recommendation is to ensure that the risk to users of level crossings is properly managed..
• Network Rail should provide guidance to risk assessors on the circumstances in which there is likely to be safety value in providing additional marking of the final decision point at footpath and bridleway crossings, and the best means of doing so. The intention of this recommendation is to support the application of the mitigation option of marking the decision point identified in the level crossing risk management toolkit.

(May 12th, 2010)